H. E. Anderson v. Elvira Magdaline Anderson : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1951
H. E. Anderson v. Elvira Magdaline Anderson : Brief
of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Sidney G. Reid; James A. Stump; Attorneys for Respondent;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Anderson v. Anderson, No. 7693 (Utah Supreme Court, 1951).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1519
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
H. E. ....-\.KDERSON, also kno,vn as 
E. I-I. £\_XliERSON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
ELVIRA l\IA.GDALINE ANDER-
SON, 
Defendant and Lippellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF· FACTS 
Case No. 
7693 
Respondent agrees generally with appellant's state-
ment of facts so far as they go, but the statement does 
not cover all matters before the trial court, a further 
and additional sta,tement of facts is therefore submitted. 
Plaintiff set out in his complaint to vacate the award 
of alimony that defendant had received far in excess of 
an equitable distributive share of the property acquired 
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by plaintiff (paragraph 11 of complaint, p. 3 of Record), 
and the court found that defendant had received such 
distributive share (Finding 3, p. 14 of Record). Defend-
ant admitted receipt of such share. 
Following appellant's statement of facts (p. 13 of 
appellant's brief) it is stated that "thereupon the court 
made its Findings of Fact, etc." The reporter's tran-
script is at pages 24 to 31 of the Record on Appeal. 
Appellant's statement of facts is based on the plead-
ings, findings and this transcript, hut there was a fur-
ther and other hearings which were not reported. Other 
facts and matters were before the, court. On S·eptember 
29, 1950, counsel for defendant (appellant here) asked 
for ten days additional time in which to make further 
effort to determine the actual fact relating to the death 
of Stanley C·. Fossell (Record, p. 28), which was granted 
(Record, p. 29). On or about October 9, 1950, the hear-
ing was resumed. Respondent's proposed amendments 
to record on appeal (Record, pages 32 and 33) relate 
to additional matters before the court, not covered by 
appellant's statement of facts. No objections or pro-
posed amendments to respondent's proposed amend-
ments were offered or made. The following is from 
respondent's proposed amendments: 
"That upon resuming said hearing on or 
about October 9, 1950, there was no stenographic 
report of proceedings and there is no such report 
available, but that at said time counsel for de-
fendant reported that he had 'vritten to Elko, 
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Nevada, and to the Division of \Tital Statistics 
of the State of Nevada, and that he was informed 
that there \\~as no record of the death of Stanley 
C. Fossell. 
·'That, at said further hearing, James A. 
Stump, of counsel for plaintiff, reported that 
he had called the County Clerk of Carbon County, 
lTtah, by telephone, and had him procure the files 
in the divorce case of Fossen v. Fossell, civil 
case K o. 2754 in the District Court of Carbon 
County; that said Clerk gave him a statement 
of all pleadings and papers filed therein; that 
a copy of sun1mons and complaint had been 
mailed to the defendant, Stanley C. Fossell, at 
Elko, Nevada, and that there was no record of 
the same having been unclaimed, not delivered 
or returned. 
uThat references during the trial and pro-
ceedings herein were made to the petition and 
n1otion of plaintiff, filed February 18, 1950, in 
case No. 82262 for an order vacating the award 
of alimony in the original divorce case in the 
District Court of Salt Lake County, to which 
petition and motion the defendant filed an answer 
and amended ans,ver and cross petition; that 
paragraphs 2 and 3 of said petition in case No. 
82262 are identical with paragraphs 2 and 3 of 
the petition in the proceedings now before the 
court; that defendant admitted the allegations 
in said paragraphs 2 and 3 in her answer, but 
later, on April 18, 1950, filed the amended answer 
and cross petition, hereinbefore mentioned, in 
which she admitted paragraph 3, and as to para-
graph 2 alleged: 
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"Answering paragraph 2 of said petition 
defendant alleges that at the time of the marriage 
between the parties in Colorado she verily be-
lieved they lawfully became husband and wife; 
that thereaf;ter she was given certain information 
which created in her mind some uncertainty re-
specting their marital status and subject to the 
foregoing allegation defendant denies each and 
all of the allegations in said paragraph." 
"That in each of said answers to plaintiff's 
petition in case No. 82262 defendant had an 
alternative prayer asking for a disclosure of the 
full amount and nature of the estate accumulated 
by the parties while they lived together as hus-
band and wife, and that an equitable distribution 
thereof be made to defendant under the decision 
in Jenkins v. Jenkins, 107 Utah 239. 
"That the foregoing matters were before the 
court at the hearings and proceedings in the 
present action on appeal." 
For the convenience of the court we set out para-
graphs 2 and 3 above referred to. 
"2. That at the time plaintiff commenced 
said action and at the time defendant filed her 
said counterclaim, and at the time of the entry 
of :the decree of divorce in said action, both plain-
tiff and defendant verily believed that they were 
husband and wife, and plaintiff, your petitioner, 
has continued to believe, that said relation of 
husband and wife so existed until a comparatively 
recent date, when he was informed and advised 
that the relation of husband and wife never at 
any time existed between plaintiff and defendant. 
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"'3. That thi8 court found in said action that 
plaintiff and defendant intern1arried at Grand 
Junction, l'iolorado, on July 14, 1926; that said 
par:ties did go through a ceremony at said time 
and place, but at said tin1e defendant had a 
husband, viz., Stanley C. F·ossell, from whon1 
she had obtained an interlocutory decree of 
divorce in the District Court of Carbon County, 
lTtah, in civil ease No. 2754, by decree dated 
May 15, 1926, but not filed until 1\iay 27, 1926; 
that in said last mentioned action defendant 
herein appeared as Elvira M. Fossell, plaintiff; 
that a true and correct copy of said decree in 
said ease No. 2754, marked Exhibit "A", is hereto 
attached and made a part hereof; that vvha.t 
purported to be a marriage between plaintiff 
and defendant at Grand Junction, Colorado, as 
aforesaid, was null and void and of no force 
and effect, and your petitioner and Elvira M. 
Fossell, also known as Elvira Magda.line ·Ander-
son, never were husband and wife, and by reason 
thereof there was no proper or any basis for 
the award of alimony in the above entitled action 
in this court." 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The court did not cast the burden on appellant 
to prove Stanley C. Fossell dead. 
2. There was ample proof to support the court's 
decision and judgment. 
3. The decisions of the Supreme Court of Utah 
support the decision and judgment. 
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4. The case of Pitcher v. Pitcher is not applicable. 
5. Respondent's contributions to appellant. 
ARGUMENT 
1. The court did not cast the burden on appellant 
to prove Stanley C. Fossell dead. 
On page 15 of appellant's brief it is stated that 
appellant places her entire reliance upon the case of 
In re Pitcher's Estate, Pitcher v. Pitcher (Utah), 197 
P. 2nd 143. It is claimed that the trial court cast the 
burden upon appellant to prove that on July 14, 1926, 
the date of the marriage ceremony of appellant and 
respondent at Grand Junction, Colorado, Stanley C. 
Fossell, from whom appellant obtained an interlocutory 
decree of divorce at Price, Utah, on May 27, 1926, was 
dead. Respondent contends that the court did no1t cast 
such burden on appellant. The day before the trial in 
District Court appellant filed an amendment to her 
answer setting up an affirmative and additional defense 
(Record, p. 10), alleging on informa;tion and· belief 
that Stanley C. Fossell died about the year 1920. Yet, 
in that same amendment alleged that after the year 1920 
she and her child went to Price, Utah, fron1 Elko, 
Nevada, where she· had been residing, and that during 
about a year af:ter she arrived at Price, Utah, she 
heard from and communicated with her said husb~d, 
Stanley C. Fossell. Fossell must have been living about 
1922, and didn't die about 1920. On September 29, 1950, 
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c•Junsel for appellant asked for ten days tiine in which 
to make further effort to deterntine the actual fact 
relating to the death of Stanley C. Fossell, which the 
court granted. Upon resuming the hearing counsel 
reported that he had \vritten to Elko, Nevada, and to 
the Division of \Tital Statistics of the State of Nevada, 
end that he \Vas informed there was no record of the 
death of said Stanley C. F·ossell. The court did not 
require counsel i'or appellant to 1nake inquiry as to 
Fossell's death, counsel requested time apparently in 
order to try and substantiate his affirmative defense 
set up. in his lac+ minute amendment. Copy of summons 
and complaint ..... appellant's divorce action was mailed 
to her husbanr Stanley C. Fossell, at Elko, Nevada, 
and there \Vas n.o record of the same being unclaimed, 
not delivered or returned. The presumption would be 
that thev were received. 
oJ 
2. There u·as an1ple proof to support the courts 
decision and judgment. 
There was ample before the trial court to sustain 
the findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgmen'.t. 
In both her answer and amended answer to plaintiff's 
petition in case No. 82262 appellant admitted all of 
paragraph 3 hereinbefore set forth, and in her alter-
native prayer asked for a disclosure of the full amount 
~ and nature of the estate accumulated by the parties 
~: while they lived together as husband and wife, · and 
~· that an equitable distribution thereof be made to her, 
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relying on the decision in Jenkins v. Jenkins, 107 Utah 
239. This equitable distribution she admits she received. 
She a;t no time prior to filing her amendment to answer 
on September 28, 1950, in the case at bar, claimed or 
intimated that Fossen was dead. Not only is this the 
fact, but in her amended answer to paragraph 2 of 
respondent's petition in case No. 82262, she alleged: 
"* * •X< that at ,the time of the marriage 
between the parties in Colorado she verily 
believed they lawfully became husband and wife; 
that thereafter she was given certain informa-
tion which created in her mind some uncertainty 
respecting their marital status * * *." 
What was the information she received which cre-
ated in her mind some uncertainly respecting their 
marital status~ It couldn't have been that Fossell was 
dead at the .time of the marriage on July 14, 1926, at 
Grand Junction, Colorado. Had that been the infor-
mation she would have known that the marriage was 
valid. We strongly suspect that the information she 
receive·d was that since she married again in less than 
two months after obtaining her interlocutory decree of 
divorce in the District Court of Carbon C·ounty her 
Grand Junction marriage was not valid. It is quite 
clear that appellant didn't think Fossell was dead then, 
yet, that wa.s after .the divorce and after July 14, 1926. 
Now just a word regarding the last amendment filed 
on ~eptember 28, 1950, setting up that a mutual friend 
that told her that Fossell was dead. It is stated on page 
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9 of appellanfs brief that the Carbon County divorce 
had been obtained on advice of counsel and of the Judge 
presiding in said court, Judge Christensen, to clarify 
her marital status. ''l e submit that if a mutual friend 
had told her that Fossell had died, and we are lead to 
believe at Elko, Nevada, the 'former home, that the 
reasonable and cormnon sense thing to have done was 
to "\vrite to Elko, where she had resided, and ve1rify the 
report concerning his death, and not call upon the 
District Judge (if she did in fact call on him) for advice, 
and then go to the trouble and expense of getting a 
divorce. If appellant did see Judge Christensen and 
tell him what she now claims, we cannot understand 
why Judge Christensen didn't advise her to verify what 
she had heard regarding Fossell's death. Appellant 
had lived in Elko and must have known residents of that 
city. The expense would have been very small, a few 
letters and postage stamps would have sufficed. 
Respondent offered to testify that he never heard 
of the claim that Fossell was dead until appellant's 
last amendment was filed just before the trial. 
Appellant's admissions by pleadings, together with 
·her acts and attendant circumstances, refute what she 
now claims. With all these admissions and circumstances 
how could the trial court find or believe that Fossell was 
dead on July 14, 1926~ 
3. The decisions of the Supreme Court of Utah 
snpport the decision and judgment. 
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Utah decisions. 
The question of the validity of marriages entered 
into in less than six months after obtaining a decree of 
divorce has been before this court in a number of cases 
and the law would appear to be wen settled. We shall 
refer to three cases only, viz., Sanders v. Industrial 
Commission, 64 Utah 372, Jenkins v. Jenkins, 107 Utah 
239, and In re Dalton's Estate, Miller v. Dalton, 109 
Utah 503. 
In the Sanders case Ruby Sanders was divorced 
from one, Sa1n Saris, in Utah, on April 25, 1923. She 
married· 0. R. Sanders at Evanston, Wyoming, on 
June 16, 1923, 52 days later. In the instant case the 
marriage was 48 days later. This court in the Sanders 
case said: 
"The marriage was a nullity from its incep-
tion, was void ab initio, and that was simply a 
fact which had been presented to the Industrial 
Com1nission which could not possibly validate 
the marriage or in any way effect it. No other 
decree of court nor finding of any other body 
was ne·eded to determine that the Wyoming mar-
riage was a nullity and could not be ratified or 
validated in Utah, as claimed by plaintiff. Hold-
ing each other out as husband and wife, belie·v-
ing in good faith that they were legally married 
* * * all these things are of no avail in this state, 
where common law marriages are not valid, and 
where marriages to be valid Inust be solemnized 
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as by statute provided. * * * Sanders was under 
neither legal nor 1noral obligation to support 
his alleged 'Yife." 
This court in the Jenkins case said: 
"In view of the fact that the plaintiff had 
only an interlocutory decree of divorce from 
her prior marriage, and· the decree had not yet 
become final, she was still married at the time 
of her purported marriage. to defendant, and 
the trial court correctly held that the purported 
marriage 'vas void ab initio." 
The court later in its opinion stated that the wife 
1s entitled to an equitable division of the property 
accumulated by the parties where they lived together 
as husband and wife, although not such. 
In re Dalton's Estate, 109 Utah 503, was decided 
April 6, 1946. In its opinion this court referred to the 
Sanders case and said: 
"This court, after pointing out that a decre.e 
of divorce does not become absolute for six 
months after its entry, and that any marriage 
contracted by a party to a divorce proceeding 
within the time allotted for an appeal from such 
final decree, shall be null and void, stated that 
the marriage was void ab initio, and no decree 
of court was needed to determine that the mar-
riage ceremony was a nullity." 
Then the court said : 
"This IS the same situation m the present 
case." 
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Dalton had obtained a decree of divorce on Decem-
ber 18, 1940, from his wife, Mildred Jolley Dalton. On 
January 14, 1941, he went through a marriage ceremony 
with \T alhalla Dalton. 
This court con tinning said : 
"On January 14, 1941, Orin Dalton could 
not marry Valhalla Dalton because he was on that 
date a married man. The ceremony on January 
14, 1941, was a nullity, and Valhalla Dalton was 
not and did not become Orin Dalton's wife." 
4. The case of Pitcher v. Pitcher is not applicable. 
The facts and circumstances in the Pitcher case 
were so different from the facts and circumstances in 
the instant case. There wasn't a Utah divorce decree 
entered less than 50 days before the new marriage to 
consider. We can well understand how the presumption 
of validity could apply in the Pitcher case. Here we 
have the interlocutory divorce decree admitted. The 
Carbon County District Court found Elvira M. Fossell 
(appellant) and Stanley C. Fossen to be husband and 
wife, and dissolved the bonds of matrimony, the decree 
to become final in six months from date of entry, which 
would be on November 27, 1926. Appellant married 
again on July 14, 1926. We contend that under the 
U:tah decisions, herein quoted from, there is no pre-
sumption of the validity of the marriage on July 14, 
1926, between appellant and respondent. It must be 
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borne in 1nind that appellant, in t'vo pleadings, adn1itted 
she had a husband, Stanley C. Fossell, when she went 
through the marriage ceremony with respondent. To 
us it seems that appellant's last minute affirmative 
defense attempting to make it appear that Fossell was 
dead when she went through the marriage ceren1ony 
with respondent is a clear case of grasping at the last 
stra''y· \V-e have no idea Fossell was dead, and appar-
ently the trial court thought the same. We do not think 
the court was required to recognize any presumption 
under the facts and circumstances and Utah decisions. 
If there was a presumption it was clearly disputed and 
rebutted by facts and circumstances. 
In appellant's brief, at page 17, it is stated that 
the court was required to recognize a presumption in 
favor of appellant that a;t the time of the marriage cere-
mony in Grand Junction she was a widow or that her 
fonner husband had divorced her, and on page 18 states 
that if Fossell had been before the trial court to testify 
that he had never divorced appellant, then there might 
be some justification in the trial court's decision. We 
answer this by stating that the admissions and matters 
in appellant's pleadings, hereinbefore referred to, and 
the fact that she brought an action for divorce in the 
District Court of Carbon County, and that court found 
appellant and Stanley C-. Fossell to be husband and wife, 
overcome any such presumption. Appellant undoubtedly 
knew Fossen hadn't divorced her, else she wouldn't 
have sued him for a divorce. 
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5. Respondent's contributions to appellant. 
One more matter before concluding. The court must 
not be mislead into thinking that respondent and appel-
lant li':ed together as husband and wife for approx-
imately 22 years prior to the divorce in 1948. In para-
graph 6 of the complaint (Record, p. 2) respondent 
alleges: 
"6. That said defendant from about the 
year 1936 refused to live with plaintiff in the 
capacity and relationship of husband and wife, 
as they thought themselves to be, and did not 
contribute to the usual companionship of hus-
band and wife; that notwithstanding defendant's 
attitude toward plaintiff since the year 1936, he 
worked and provided for her until she obtained 
said decree of divorce, and has since paid ali-
mony regularly under said decree." 
Note that respondent contends that there were 12 of 
the 22 years that appellant refused to live with him in 
the capacity of husband and wife and that she did not 
contribute to the usual companionship of husband and 
wife. Yet, he worked and provided for her until she was 
gran!ted the divorce, after which he paid ali1nony regu-
larly, and in addition appellant has had an equitable 
share of all property accumulated during the 22 year 
period, in fact has received practically all respondent 
ever accumulated. The equitable division referred to in 
Jenkins v. Jenkins has long since been made. 
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion we submit: 
1. The trial court did not cast any burden of proof 
on defendant and appellant. 
2. Assuming that the burden of proVIng Stanley 
C. Fossell's death was erroneously placed on defendant 
and appellant, that plaintiff and respondent did in fact 
sustain the burden of proving the. marriage entered 
into at Grand Junction, Colorado, on July 14, 1926, void; 
that the proof sustained the findings of fact, conclusions 
of law and judgment, and the error, if any, of the trial 
court in misconceiving the burden of proof, was not pre-
judicial. 
3. That the court's decision was right and is sup-
ported by appellant's admissions, the facts and circum-
stances, and the decisions of this Honorable Court. 
SIDNEY G. REID, 
JAMES A. STUMP, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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